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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2078 
_____________ 
 
ROBERT REILLY, 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LEHIGH VALLEY HOSPITAL 
___________                       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5-09-cv-05816) 
District Judge: Honorable Henry S. Perkin 
___________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 21, 2012 
 
Before:    McKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 29, 2013) 
___________                      
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Robert Reilly appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Lehigh Valley Hospital (“LVH”) on Reilly’s disability 
discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 
12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 P.S. §§ 951-
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963.  LVH has moved on appeal for damages pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court and deny LVH’s Rule 38 motion.   
I. 
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case.  Accordingly, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis. 
 Robert Reilly was employed by LVH as a part-time Security Officer from August,  
2006, until May 2, 2008.  After receiving a conditional employment offer, Reilly 
completed and signed a six-page employee health information form (the “Employment 
Form”) as part of LVH’s hiring process.  The final two questions on the Employment 
Form inquired: “Have you ever been recognized as or diagnosed with alcoholism or drug 
addiction?  Have you ever been or are you now being treated for alcoholism or drug 
addiction? . . . If so, specify type of treatment[.]”  (J.A. 143.)  Reilly answered “no” to 
both questions, and left blank the follow up inquiry requesting specification of the type of 
treatment.  A handwritten note underneath the questions reads: “denies drug/alcohol 
addiction.”1
 After completing his over-night shift on April 4, 2008, Reilly returned to LVH on 
April 5, 2008 and was admitted to the Emergency Room to receive treatment for an eye 
  (J.A. 143.)  Reilly signed the Form subject to the condition that “falsifying 
of this information could result in withdrawal of the employment offer or if subsequently 
discovered termination of [his] employment.”  (J.A. 144.) 
                                                          
 1  Reilly testified that he did not write this note and does not recall who did. 
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injury he believed he sustained on the job.  Reilly disclosed to the treating physician that 
he has a history of narcotics use and is a recovering drug addict.  The treating physician 
noted this history on the Emergency Department Physician Clinical Report:  “History of 
drug use: narcotics.  Is a recovering addict.”  (J.A. 146.) 
 Following the April 5, 2008, hospital visit, the Emergency Room sent the Clinical 
Report to the LVH Employee Health Services Department.2
 On May 2, 2008, LVH terminated Reilly’s employment.  The personnel report 
prepared in conjunction with his termination explained the basis for the employment 
action:  
  The Health Services 
Department, in turn, notified the LVH Human Resources Department of Reilly’s 
admission that he is a recovering addict and alerted the Department that Reilly had not 
been truthful on the Employment Form.    
During a recent visit to our E.R. to evaluate an injury you had 
received, it was discovered that you had provided information 
that indicated you were a recovering addict.  In a review of 
your pre-employment record, however, you denied any 
addiction to drugs or alcohol.  [LVH] considers the failure to 
disclose this information as dishonesty, and per our 
Counseling and Discipline policy, 2000.40, we are 
terminating your employment effective immediately . . . .3
 
  
                                                          
 2  “[W]hen a LVH employee sustains a possible work-related injury and is treated 
by LVH healthcare provider(s), the medical treatment records of the LVH-treated 
employees are routinely furnished to the [Health Services Department], which manages 
and administers workers’ compensation issues . . . .”  (J.A. 148.) 
 
 3  Policy 2000.40 provides that “[i]mmediate discharge may occur” for enumerated 
infractions, including “[d]ishonesty.”  (J.A. 153.)   
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(J.A. 150.)  In the section of the report reserved for employee comments, Reilly wrote: “I 
do not recall intentionally withholding or denying any facts about myself.”  (J.A. 150.)   
 On November 9, 2009, Reilly filed suit against LVH in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, alleging disability-based employment 
discrimination in violation of the ADA and PHRA.  LVH removed the action to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and moved for 
summary judgment.  See Reilly v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., No. 09-CV-5816, 2012 WL 
895459, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2012).   
 In deposition testimony given in connection with the suit, Reilly testified that he is 
a recovering alcoholic and narcotics addict who attended, and still attends, Alcoholics 
Anonymous (“AA”) and Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”) meetings several times each 
week.  Reilly further testified that in 1995, following a conviction for DUI in 
Pennsylvania State court, he attended approximately forty hours of programs at a 
Livengrin drug and alcohol treatment facility as a condition of his participation in the 
court’s Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program.   
 When asked if he had “ever received any medical care, therapy, or counseling for 
drug issues,” Reilly testified: “Other than Livengrin, no.”  (J.A. 64.)  Reilly explained 
that he does not consider himself to have received addiction treatment at Livengrin 
because no change occurred in his substance abuse behavior.  He considers his time at 
Livengrin simply to have been “fulfil[lment] of a requirement of the state and that’s it.”  
(J.A. 66.)  
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 On March 15, 2012, the District Court granted LVH’s summary judgment motion 
on Reilly’s disability discrimination claims under the ADA and PHRA.  Reilly timely 
appealed.4
II. 
  LVH later moved for attorneys’ fees and double costs pursuant to Rule 38 of 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.  To date, Reilly has not filed a response to 
LVH’s Rule 38 motion.  
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Reilly’s ADA claim 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
A. 
 Reilly first argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for 
LVH, asserting that LVH violated § 12112(d)(3) of the ADA by disclosing Reilly’s 
medical records to the Human Resources Department after his visit to the LVH 
Emergency Room for treatment for a work-related injury.  Significantly, Reilly did not 
present an improper medical disclosure claim in his complaint.  Nor did he oppose the 
LVH summary judgment motion on this ground in the District Court.5
                                                          
4  The District Court also granted summary judgment on Reilly’s claim for 
improper medical inquiry in violation of § 12112(d)(2) of the ADA.  See Reilly, 2012 WL 
895459, at *7-10.  On appeal, Reilly contends that he never raised such a claim.  Because 
Reilly does not appeal this portion of the District Court’s decision, we need not address 
the District Court’s findings with respect to § 12112(d)(2).   
   
 
 5  As LVH points out, in his deposition testimony, Reilly expressly disclaimed a 
cause of action for improper medical disclosure under the ADA or any other statutory 
scheme.  (J.A. 82.)  Furthermore, Reilly did not oppose LVH’s motion in limine “to 
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“It is well established that failure to raise an issue in the district court constitutes a 
waiver of the argument.”  Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of 
Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991).  Thus, Reilly is precluded from arguing on 
appeal that LVH violated § 12112(d)(3) by sharing his medical records among Hospital 
departments.  See Cady v. Twin Rivers Towing Co., 486 F.2d 1335, 1337 (3d Cir. 1973).   
B. 
 
Reilly also challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on his 
claims for disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and PHRA.  We apply a de 
novo standard of review to grants of summary judgment, “applying the same standard as 
the district court.”  Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  “Viewing 
the facts in the light most favorable to [Reilly], we must determine whether there was a 
genuine issue of material fact, and, if not, whether [LVH] was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006).  
We apply the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to claims under the ADA.6
                                                                                                                                                                                           
preclude references to alleged HIPAA violations by the Defendant” related to the 
disclosure of his medical records.  (S.A. 61.).   
  See Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 
204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000).  First, we must consider whether the plaintiff can 
establish a prima facie case.  To make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination 
under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that he or she: (1) has a “disability” or is 
 
 6  The same analytical framework governs discrimination claims under the ADA 
and PHRA.  See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).Therefore, our 
analysis of Reilly’s ADA claim applies equally to his PHRA claim.  See id.    
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regarded as having a “disability”; (2) is otherwise qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the job; and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because of his 
disability.  See id.  Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 
U.S. at 802.  If the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff is then “afforded a fair 
opportunity to show that [the defendant’s] stated reason for [the adverse employment 
action] was in fact pretext.”  Id. at 804.   
The District Court concluded that, even assuming Reilly established a prima facie 
case of disability discrimination, LVH articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for terminating Reilly – his dishonesty on the Employment Form – and Reilly failed to 
satisfy his burden of adducing sufficient evidence to show this reason was pretextual.  
See Reilly, 2012 WL 895459, at *4-7.  Reilly contends that he met his burden of showing 
that LVH’s reason for terminating him  was pretextual.  The only evidence of pretext 
Reilly points to on appeal, however, is that “he answered truthfully with regards to 
whether he ever received treatment for alcoholism or drug abuse, as he believed treatment 
at Livegrin [sic] was mandatory for his previous DUI.”  (Appellant’s Br. 17.) 
Reilly’s belief that he answered the pertinent inquiries truthfully is not the 
determinative factor.  The question is whether the decision maker at LVH could regard 
Reilly’s responses as dishonest.  The answer to that question is resoundingly, “yes.”  The 
undisputed evidence establishes that Reilly received forty hours of drug and alcohol 
addiction treatment at Livengrin, and that he regularly attended, and still attends, AA and 
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NA meetings.  Furthermore, Reilly admitted during his deposition testimony that he is a 
recovering alcoholic and drug addict.  Nonetheless, Reilly answered “no” to questions on 
the Employment Form inquiring if he had ever been or currently was “recognized as,” 
“diagnosed with,” or “treated for alcoholism or drug addiction.”  (J.A. 143.)   
Given this undisputed evidence, Reilly’s bare assertion that he completed the 
Employment Form truthfully because he believed the purpose of the treatment at 
Livengrin was to resolve his DUI charge, not treat his addictions, is insufficient “to 
permit a factfinder either to disbelieve [LVH’s] articulated reasons, or to conclude that 
discrimination on account of disability was the real reason” for Reilly’s termination.  
Shaner, 204 F.3d at 502.  Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in 
granting LVH summary judgment on Reilly’s disability discrimination claims under the 
ADA and PHRA.   
C. 
 
 Finally, we turn to LVH’s motion for attorneys’ fees and double costs pursuant to 
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Pursuant to Rule 38, “[i]f a court of 
appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or 
notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and 
single or double costs to the appellee.”  Fed. R. App. P. 38.   
 According to LVH, Reilly’s appeal is frivolous because of the differing theories of 
liability raised in his complaint, summary judgment opposition brief, and appellate brief.  
LVH further argues that the appeal is frivolous because Reilly waived his argument that 
LVH violated § 12112(d)(3) by failing to present this argument to the District Court, and 
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because both Reilly and his counsel previously disavowed a claim for improper medical 
disclosure on the record.   
 “Although often mistakenly referred to as both, an award under Rule 38 is neither 
a sanction nor a punishment.”  Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 108-09 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“[Rule 38] is . . . designed to make whole a party victimized by needlessly having to 
expend money for attorney fees to protect a valid judgment from a baseless attack.”).  
“We only impose damages under Rule 38 when an appeal is wholly without merit,” i.e. 
when there is no “colorable argument” in support of the appeal.  Mellon Bank Corp. v. 
First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortg. Invs., 951 F.2d 1399, 1413 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
determining whether an appeal is frivolous, we “employ an objective standard.”  Id. 
 We cannot say that there is no colorable argument in favor of Reilly’s appeal such 
that “there was no possibility of success.”  Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Although Reilly waived any arguments related to an improper medical disclosure 
claim by failing to present them to the District Court, his arguments related to his 
disability discrimination claims, while only “tenuously arguable,” are not “wholly 
without merit.”  Nagle, 8 F.3d at 145 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, because Reilly presented at least one colorable argument, Rule 38 
damages are not warranted.  See, e.g., Sauers v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 771 F.2d 
64, 70 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985).   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and deny 
LVH’s Rule 38 motion. 
